Mainstreaming Euroscepticism?:An analysis of the effects of the politicisation of Europe in domestic elections on the framing strategies of the centre-right in Britain, France and Germany by Pawley, Nicholas
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LES CAHIERS EUROPEENS DE SCIENCES PO 
 
 
 
> N°03/2017 
Mainstreaming Euroscepticism?  
An analysis of the effects of the 
politicisation of Europe in domestic 
elections on the framing strategies of 
the centre-right in Britain, France and 
Germany 
 
>Nicholas Pawley 
Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po 
  
 
 
N° 03/2017 
December 2017 
 
 
Nicholas Pawley 
 
 
Mainstreaming Euroscepticism? An analysis of the effects 
of the politicisation of Europe in domestic elections on the 
framing strategies of the centre-right in Britain, France and 
Germany 
 
 
Nicholas Pawley is a 2017 graduate of the ‘Euromaster’ programme of Contemporary European 
Studies operated by the European American University Consortium. Following the so-called ‘annus 
horribilis’ of 2016 for the European Union, He decided to explore the relationship between European 
integration and Euroscepticism in his Master’s dissertation.  
Contact: njp39@bath.ac.uk 
 
Citation: Nicholas Pawley (2017), Mainstreaming Euroscepticism? An analysis of the effects 
of the politicisation of Europe in domestic elections on the framing strategies of the centre-
right in Britain, France and Germany, Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po, n°3, Paris: 
Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics at Sciences Po. 
 
 
Nicholas Pawley - Mainstreaming Euroscepticism? An analysis of the effects of the politicisation of Europe in domestic 
elections on the framing strategies of the centre-right in Britain, France and Germany 
 
Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po – n° 03/2017  3 
 
Abstract 
(EN) The functional logic that had for so long guided European member states along the path 
towards ‘ever closer union’ has been challenged more and more strongly in recent years by a 
growing voice of popular dissent. Where previously, matters at the European table were kept out of 
the realms of domestic electoral politics, more recently they have come to the fore, as European 
integration has become ever more politicised in the light of a wave of radical right wing populist, 
single issue parties contesting the ‘elite consensus’ that more Europe is a good thing. This 
politicisation of Europe has left incumbents in an uncomfortable situation as they are forced to 
mobilise on an issue that they would rather see left off the agenda. This paper explores the framing 
strategies that centre-right parties deploy vis-à-vis Europe in domestic electoral campaigns, to 
decipher whether the heightened politicisation of European integration has provoked a Eurosceptic 
response among the erstwhile visionaries of the European project. Using an inductive textual 
analysis of manifesto data from three centre-right parties of the largest European Union (EU) 
member states, the present study finds that the politicisation of European integration follows party-
systemic logics – but that there is nonetheless a remarkable tendency among the centre-right to 
frame Europe more and more in cultural-identitarian terms than in economic-utilitarian terms. 
Whether this alone can be equated to a tendency towards Euroscepticism remains an open 
question.  
Key words: European integration; Euroscepticism; postfunctionalism; framing; centre-right; domestic 
elections; politicisation; France; Germany; UK 
Résumé :  
(FR) La logique fonctionnaliste qui avait pendant un long moment guidé les Etats Membres vers 
une ‘union sans cesse plus étroite’ s’est récemment vu contestée de plus en plus fortement dans 
l’opinion. Alors que les problématiques européennes restaient en dehors de la sphère de la 
politique domestique, elles sont récemment passées au premier plan. L’intégration européenne est 
devenue de plus en plus politisée dans le contexte d’une vague de populisme radical et de partis 
politiques spécialement focalisés sur ce thème. Cette politisation de l’Europe a forcé les partis au 
pouvoir à se positionner sur la question européenne qu’ils préféraient laisser de côté. Cette étude 
explore les stratégies de cadrage (framing strategies) adoptées par les partis du centre-droit vis-à-
vis la question européenne dans les campagnes électorales domestiques. Elle cherche à déchiffrer 
si la politisation grandissante de l’intégration européenne a provoqué une réponse eurosceptique 
chez ses soutiens habituels du projet européen. Se servant d’une analyse textuelle inductive de 
programmes électoraux des trois partis du centre-droit des trois plus grands Etats Membres de 
l’Union (la France, l’Allemagne, et le Royaume-Uni), l’étude trouve que la politisation de l’intégration 
européenne suit les logiques des systèmes de parti (et non pas une logique structurelle). Il y a 
néanmoins une tendance remarquable parmi les partis de centre-droit à travers les trois pays de 
déployer de plus en plus de cadrage dans la catégorie ‘culturelle-identitaire’ que de la catégorie 
‘économique-utilitaire’ – ce qui implique un changement en vue de la nouvelle vague de 
contestation. La question de savoir s’il s’agit ici d’une tendance vers l’euroscepticisme au sein du 
centre-droit reste, pour le moment, une question ouverte.  
Mots clés : intégration européenne ; politisation ; euroscepticisme ; post-fonctionnalisme ; framing 
(cadrage) ; centre-droit ; élections domestiques ; France ; Royaume-Uni ; Allemagne 
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1. Introduction 
The Maastricht Treaty of the early 1990s has come to be seen as a critical juncture in the 
development of the course of European integration by scholars of European Studies. The expansion 
of competences at the European level from principally an economic community to a political union 
has been cast as the end of the ‘permissive consensus’ - defined as passive popular trust in elite 
decision-makers’ choices (Scheingold, Lindberg, 1970) - replaced instead by a more critical, 
dissenting public opinion (Eichenberg, Dalton 2007; Hooghe, Marks, 2009), seemingly in tandem 
with the further pooling of member state sovereignty. Indeed, studies have revealed that popular 
opinion has declined as the mass of legislation from the European level mounts up (Franklin, 
Wlezien, 1997).  
This retrenchment in public opinion towards Europe throughout the 1990s, despite ‘positive 
economic conditions’, led to a re-evaluation of understandings of citizen support for integration 
(Eichenberg, Dalton, 2007). Whereas previously a utilitarian logic was assumed to drive support for 
further integration, with citizens evaluating integration in terms of costs and benefits (Ibid., 130), 
closer political integration has seen symbolic politics of identity come to the fore as a potential 
explanatory factor for the eroding support of the EU (McLaren, 2006).  
This shift has led certain scholars to assert that previously dominant theories of European 
integration based on functionalist, elite-centred logic, needed to be re-evaluated to ‘re-insert’ the 
symbolic, values-based politics, as Europe becomes more contested, and thus more politicised in 
domestic electoral settings. This paper therefore seeks to understand how parties depict Europe in 
domestic elections. Using an inductive textual analysis to examine manifesto data from the three 
most recent elections in France, Germany and the UK, the paper examines the evolving framing 
strategies of the centre-right parties in the context of heightened politicisation of Europe. The 
findings reveal that under conditions of heightened politicisation, centre-right parties take recourse 
to cultural-identitarian frames with increasing regularity. This coincides with an increasingly negative 
portrayal of Europe in these terms by the centre-right parties under examination.  
The study unfolds in seven principal parts. In the first section, a general overview of the concept of 
politicisation is offered, before the second section turns to the specific element of framing, and the 
use of frames among the centre-right party-family. It also provides a short background into the 
country-cases selected for scrutiny in the present study. The third section lays out the three 
hypotheses that the study seeks to test relating to parties’ uses of frames within domestic elections, 
while the fourth section elaborates on the methodology to be employed in order to test the 
hypotheses. The fifth section addresses the research design and reports the initial results of the 
study. The sixth section then discusses and analyses the results more thoroughly and in line with 
the hypotheses proposed, before the seventh section rounds off with some conclusions on the 
evolving use of frames by the centre-right, and what this might mean for the future course of 
European integration.  
1.1 European Integration: A sleeping Giant? 
 While European integration has become an ever-more contested issue at the level of popular 
opinion, the level of importance given to this issue by political actors is the subject of scholarly 
debate. While some scholars posit that traditional left/right cleavages structure party positions on 
European integration (Marks, Wilson, 2000), others argue that the issue of European integration 
runs orthogonally to traditional cleavages, along a new pro/anti-EU dimension (Taggart, 1998; Eijk, 
Franklin, 2004). Plotting party positions against voter positions on both the traditional left/right 
cleavage dimension and a pro/anti-EU dimension, Eijk and Franklin (2004) find that opinion is 
significantly more widely dispersed towards the extremes on the pro/anti-EU dimension than on the 
traditional left/right dimension. This is deemed to highlight the more unstable, polarising nature of 
the European dimension than the traditional left/right, as well as the difficulty for mainstream parties 
of integrating EU issues into their traditional ideological positions. This leads to what Eijk and 
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Franklin dub the ‘sleeping giant’ – the issue of European integration ripens for politicisation as 
voters are unable to express their opinions on this issue at the ballot box (De Vries, 2007).  
Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2004) find that in the face of changing orientations towards European 
integration issues among both mainstream left and mainstream right parties, a new dimension of 
contestation proved to be the most powerful predictor of positions on European issues. This 
dimension relates to what they call ‘new politics issues’, such as immigration, nationalism, cultural 
diversity, ecology and lifestyle (Hooghe, Marks, Wilson, 2004: 130), and coincides with Inglehart’s 
post-materialist values. They label this new, cultural axis the Green, Alternative Libertarian (GAL) 
versus Traditional, Authoritarian Nationalist (TAN) axis – GAL-TAN. They conclude that this axis 
exerts a strong and consistent effect on EU issues (Ibid. 132). This new axis is corroborated by the 
work of Hanspeter Kriesi (2007), who similarly identifies a new conflict dimension, which he labels 
integration versus demarcation. This new cleaving line pits the so-called winners of globalisation 
against the losers (Kriesi, 2007: 85). He argues that there are two key aspects of this conflict; 
namely an economic and a cultural aspect. The European integration issue provides a challenge for 
parties within the context of this new dimension of political conflict, as it is almost orthogonal to the 
traditional left/right dimension, in that the left is divided between the perceived threats of economic 
integration for its social achievements, and the cultural aspects of denationalisation that chime with 
their internationalist traditions, while the right is supportive of economic denationalisation, but 
culturally opposed to the opening up of borders (Ibid. 86-7).  
In light of their discovery of the importance of this second dimension of political conflict for EU 
issues, Hooghe and Marks (2009) devise a postfunctionalist theory of European integration. The 
central tenet of this new theory is that governance has two purposes; ‘to achieve collective benefits 
by co-ordinating human activity’, and to be ‘an expression of community’ (Hooghe, Marks, 2009: 2). 
However, given that these two central tenets of governance rarely coincide in multilevel 
governance, gaining an understanding of when identity is mobilised and integration politicised is 
essential to predict the future course of European integration. If the ‘elite-centred’ view of integration 
rested on three assumptions - that public attitudes towards integration are superficial and 
unstructured; that integration is a low-salience issue; and that issues raised by integration are 
unrelated to the conflicts that structure political competition - the period beginning since the 1990s is 
said to have debunked all three of these assumptions (Ibid: 6-7). Hooghe and Marks explain the 
retrenchment in public opinion towards Europe in terms of identity. While the jurisdictional shape of 
Europe has transformed, the ways in which the citizens conceive their identities have remained 
stable (Ibid:12). This causes tension, which can be activated under two conditions: the tension must 
become politically salient; and there must be a presence of political entrepreneurs mobilising the 
tensions by constructing connections between national identity, cultural and economic insecurities 
and European integration (Ibid. 13). Postfunctionalism posits that the primacy of identity in multilevel 
governance has caused the traditional left/right conflict dimension of party politics to be usurped by 
the GAL-TAN conflict dimension in debates around European issues.  
1.2 What is politicisation? 
The underlying factor that differentiates postfunctionalism from its theoretical predecessors of 
neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism is the impact of politicisation on European integration. 
Whereas neofunctionalism predicts that politicisation will lead to further integration, as citizens' 
loyalties transfer to the supranational level of governance, and intergovernmentalism largely ignores 
the phenomenon (Hooghe, Marks, 2009), postfunctionalism posits that politicisation re-inserts 
symbolic issues of identity, which undermines utilitarian cost/benefit evaluations that have driven 
further integration to this point. Politicisation of European integration is defined as ‘an increase in 
polarisation of opinions, interests or values’ (De Wilde, 2011: 560). Hutter and Grande (2014) 
identify four dimensions of politicisation, namely intensity, visibility, direction and scope. These are 
translated into operational terms as issue salience (visibility); actor expansion (scope); and actor 
polarisation (intensity and direction). While issue salience is measured as the proportionate 
emphasis actors place on the issue of Europe in comparison to others on a given issue agenda at 
any given time, and actor expansion is measured as the number of competitors on a given issue, 
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actor polarisation refers to the degree of difference between the main protagonists within a party 
system (Hoeglinger, 2016).  
As the scholarly literature on politicisation has gained prevalence, so the number of studies testing 
for politicisation of the European issue has grown. One of the ‘established wisdoms’ of students of 
European integration, is that the acceleration of integration since the 1980s has led to increased 
salience of this issue in domestic political debates (Guinaudeau, Persico, 2013). However, despite 
being repeatedly tested, this wisdom does not bear out empirically (Ibid.; Hoeglinger, 2016; Kriesi 
2007; Grande, Kriesi 2016). Even if the salience of European integration is found to have increased 
over time, what is found is ‘punctuated politicisation’ (Grande, Kriesi, 2016), where European 
integration flares up as a highly salient issue at various instances in time in different domestic 
settings, before going back to being only a moderately salient issue.  
In his own empirical analysis of the politicisation of European integration in domestic party systems, 
Dominic Hoeglinger finds that EU integration is tenth on a list of twelve salient issues for the six 
countries in his case study. He therefore concludes that the salience of European integration is only 
modest (Hoeglinger, 2016: 128). However, in a further step in his investigation, this measure of 
politicisation is then complemented with the measure of polarisation. On this scale, European 
integration comes in joint top of the twelve issues, along with the army, as the most polarising issue 
for political actors (Ibid). While high levels of polarisation are not necessarily accompanied by high 
salience, Hoeglinger addresses the need to take these measures together. When combined, 
Europe is ranked as an upper mid-range issue in terms of politicisation (Ibid: 131). This finding 
leads Hoeglinger to characterise politicisation of European integration as modestly salient but highly 
polarised; concluding that the presence of a strong party close to the TAN pole of the GAL-TAN 
conflict dimension is conducive to politicisation of integration, as it pushes the issue onto the 
agenda.  
Similarly, in a summary of their own findings on drivers of politicisation of European integration, 
Grande and Kriesi find qualified support for their hypothesis of increased salience, but clear 
confirmation of their hypothesis of increased polarisation. They reject the hypothesis of actor 
expansion as a factor of politicisation (2016: 283), which might lead us to modify the dimensions of 
politicisation to remove the 'scope' factor from the operational definition proposed earlier. They also 
find that less integrated countries tend to provide the most fertile ground for politicisation of 
European issues, which is suggestive that politicisation is not necessarily produced by the 
accumulated effects of authority transfers, but rather results from conflicts over membership 
(Grande, Hutter, 2016: 108). A positive relationship between frames pertaining to the TAN pole of 
the GAL-TAN conflict dimension and the level of politicisation is also observed, corroborating 
Hoeglinger’s findings of a relationship between actors’ proximity to the TAN pole and levels of 
politicisation.  
2. Framing Europe 
Following the findings of Eijk and Franklin (2004) of a polarisation of opinions towards the extremes 
of a new political cleaving line, and following Hooghe Marks and Wilson’s (2004) discovery of the 
GAL-TAN cleavage on the issue of Europe, an examination of the use of frames by mainstream 
right parties is envisaged, in order to trace whether political competition has indeed shifted to this 
GAL-TAN cleavage, and whether this has pushed parties away from the centre and closer to the 
extremes of this cleavage. It is believed that a heightened recourse to cultural-identitarian frames in 
relation to Europe by these parties would be accompanied by lower EU-favourability in mainstream 
parties, as they evacuate their central position on the left/right cleavage towards a more polarised 
position on the GAL-TAN cleavage. To this end, it is the framing strategies of political actors that will 
be examined in greater depth in order to gain an understanding of how actors position themselves 
on issues pertaining to Europe, in the context of domestic electoral campaigns. If, as anticipated, 
the issue of Europe causes polarisation, we might expect this to be reflected in the way in which 
parties address European issues. If the examination of centre-right parties reveals that political 
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contestation on Europe has shifted to the cultural, GAL-TAN cleaving line, then this should provide 
insight into the validity of the postfunctionalist theory of integration.  
In order to understand how parties position themselves in relation to Europe, it is necessary to study 
the process of framing of European integration. Frames are schemata of interpretation (Helbling, 
Hoeglinger, Wuest 2010: 498), while the act of framing refers to the ‘more or less consciously 
managed process by which schemata are manufactured, selected, distributed and adopted in 
successive steps (Ibid). Frames are essentially thought organisers (Ferree et al 2002), which can be 
deployed strategically to shift the central logic of a political conflict (Grande et al 2016:181).  In the 
words of Diez, Medrano and Gray (2010: 196), frames are images of reality, and it is they, not reality 
itself, which shape behaviour.  
In the multitude of studies that have examined party framing strategies towards European 
integration issues (Helbling et al 2010; Hoeglinger, 2016; Hutter, Grande et al, 2016), a consensus 
has been reached on the basic frame categories mobilised. These frame categories are largely in 
line with individual attitudes towards Euroscepticism (Helbling et al, 2010), in that they are cultural 
frames, economic frames and utilitarian frames. These three categories can be further broken down 
into subcategories.  
The cultural frames category contains subcategories of nationalist frames, referring to exclusive 
ethnic and institutional civic values, and multicultural universalist frames. Ethnic nationalist frames 
generally emphasise cultural homogeneity and the exclusivity of identity, whereas institutional-civic 
nationalist frames uphold the exceptionality of a political community (Hoeglinger, 2016).  By 
contrast, multicultural-universalist frames argue in favour of cultural openness and harmonious 
coexistence of diverse groups in society (Ibid.).  
The economic frame category can be split into the subcategories of labour and social security 
frames, versus economic prosperity and wealth frames. Labour and social security frames include 
arguments related to employment prospects, level of wages and welfare systems, where economic 
prosperity frames include arguments about competitiveness, economic growth and wealth (Ibid.).  
The utilitarian frame category includes political efficiency and efficacy frames, referring to arguments 
about effective governance and bureaucratic efficiency, the capacity of a state to act, and channels 
of power. Within this category is also included security and ecology as a subcategory, with 
references to peace and regional stability, as well as environmental protections (Ibid.).  It is 
important to note that all subcategories of frames can be mobilised both in favour of and in 
contestation against European integration. Therefore, the presence of a greater number of 
nationalist frames in a party's discourse does not necessarily indicate a more Eurosceptic stance 
towards integration.  
In terms of the two conflict dimensions on which European integration issues are fought, it might be 
expected that parties further to the right of the left/right cleavage draw on more economic frames 
pertaining to economic prosperity to justify favourable positions to European integration, while 
parties on the left might draw on labour and social security frames to justify positions of contestation 
of further integration (Hoeglinger, 2016). On the cultural axis, it is expected that those parties 
gravitating more closely to the TAN pole will utilise nationalist frames to contest European 
integration, while those parties closer to the GAL pole will utilise multicultural-universalist frames to 
justify further integration (Ibid.). What does this mean for framing strategies of mainstream centre-
right parties? 
2.1 Framing Strategies of the Centre-Right 
The extant literature generally agrees that mainstream parties find Europe an unattractive issue on 
which to mobilise (Green-Pedersen, 2012). This is the case for two reasons: firstly, the issue itself 
does not fit neatly into the traditional left/right conflict dimension that still commands a hegemony 
over most electoral issues; secondly that voting behaviour on this issue is largely dependent on how 
the issue is framed, which means it is a highly unpredictable issue. Given that mainstream right 
parties are generally deemed to be pro-European integration, due to their role in building the project 
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(Kriesi, 2007), they have largely sought to avoid contestation on the issue by keeping Europe off the 
electoral agenda.  
However, as has been previously alluded to, it is thought that the importance of the cultural 
dimension of political conflict has usurped the economic dimension in terms of political contestation 
of European integration. This is what is referred to as the cultural shift hypothesis (Hutter Grande et 
al 2016). This has had knock-on effects for the centre-right’s strategy on European integration 
issues. Grande, Hutter et al (2016) also find that there has been a marked increase in the use of 
cultural frames in domestic debates on Europe over time. Perhaps surprisingly, they find that 
multicultural-universalist frames vastly outnumber nationalist frames. They also find that the populist 
radical right has no monopoly over the use of nationalist frames, with moderate right-wing parties 
using them most often, accounting for 40% of all nationalist frames in election contests. In spite of 
this, the authors find that cultural framing is not the most important strategy for centre-right, and that 
nationalist frames are in fact often used to support European integration by these parties. They 
conclude that as a result of their heightened use of cultural frames, it is therefore moderate right 
parties, rather radical right parties, that must be considered the most forceful drivers of the 
politicisation of Europe (Ibid: 197).  
2.2 British, French and German Centre-Right Parties: Case selection 
The cases of British, French and German centre-right parties will be taken up in the present study. 
As the three biggest nations of Europe, these cases have all been impactful on the course of 
European integration in their own ways. Indeed, these three cases are representative of three 
different actor clusters within the intergovernmental EU political space, as envisioned by Kriesi and 
Maag (2016: 225). These clusters are: the integrationist cluster, as the most pro-European cluster of 
actors, of which the German government is a constant feature; the protectionist cluster, which is 
described as generally pro-European but more wary of economic liberalisation, and consists of the 
French government as one of its key actors; while the third cluster type, which is labelled the 
neoliberal cluster, is dominated by the British government and generally acknowledges the need for 
economic integration but is hesitant about political integration. They therefore provide a suitably 
wide variety of approaches to the question of European integration.  
3. Hypotheses 
As alluded to above, two elements are posited to be key to a cultural shift by centre-right parties. 
The first of these is the presence of a strong radical right party. This is because parties mobilise on 
the issues that are most important to their constituents – and while larger, mainstream parties will 
compete on a broad range of issues, single-issue parties can draw attention to their particular issue 
if it resonates with the wider public, thereby forcing it onto the electoral agenda (Netjes, Binnema, 
2007). While Guinaudeau and Persico differentiate the French case from the German and the 
British one in this regard, this observation must be updated, as all three party-systems now contain 
a radical right element, and while UKIP may have garnered only one seat in the British elections of 
2015, its vote share of 12.6% is indicative of its rise (+9.5% on its 2010 share, the largest increase 
in its votes of any party by some distance) (BBC, 2015). Before the 2017 election, AfD remained a 
very marginal force in German politics, with just 4.7% of the vote in its first federal election of 2013; 
however, the outcome of the 2017 election, in which the AfD garnered 12.6% of the vote to become 
the third-largest party in Germany, and take over 90 seats in the Bundestag, provides evidence that 
the German electoral agenda increasingly resembles that of France and the UK, with a strong 
radical right element.  
The second element for a cultural shift is thought to be the level of importance political actors place 
on the new, GAL-TAN cleaving line of political contestation. Given the significant retrenchment in 
public opinion vis-à-vis European integration, and given the highly polarised nature of public opinion 
on this issue (Eijk, Franklin, 2004), parties’ positions are expected to reflect this polarisation in their 
contestation along the new, GAL-TAN cleaving line. To test for this polarisation, it is the use of 
cultural frames that becomes the dependent variable in this study, with the expectation that the 
Nicholas Pawley - Mainstreaming Euroscepticism? An analysis of the effects of the politicisation of Europe in domestic 
elections on the framing strategies of the centre-right in Britain, France and Germany 
Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po – n° 03/2017  10 
importance of the GAL-TAN cleavage will translate into an increased use of cultural frames by 
centre-right parties in proportion to economic/utilitarian frames. 
The question to be addressed in the course of this study is thus how do mainstream centre-right 
parties of the British, French and German party systems deploy cultural frames in their most recent 
electoral campaigns? 
Building on previous research, this paper will focus exclusively on elections of the previous decade 
in the respective countries, as this era of elections is yet to be studied. It is expected that a general 
trend of increasing salience of Europe in domestic electoral settings will be visible (H1a), though 
that the level of salience of Europe will differ substantially in each electoral setting (H1b).  
As per the cultural shift hypothesis (Hutter, Grande et al, 2016), and in line with Hoeglinger's (2016) 
findings, greater salience is expected to be matched by greater recourse of the centre-right to 
cultural framing strategies (H2a). Finally, following Hoeglinger (2016), greater recourse to cultural 
framing is expected to be linked to greater criticism of Europe, especially in the face of any strong 
radical right challenger parties in the party system (H2b).  
4. Methodology 
In order to address the research question at hand, the paper will take a diachronic and multilevel 
comparison of framing of the issue of Europe by centre-right parties in domestic election campaigns. 
The time period under examination is the last decade, from 2007 to the present. This timeframe 
complements previous research in the area, by adding a previously unexamined time period, and 
provides scope to examine new evolutions beyond what has previously been observed in the 
literature. To that end, data will be scrutinised from party election manifestos in the course of the 
election campaigns. Manifestos are useful as a representation of the official position of a party at a 
certain point in time (Volkens, 2007), as they are generally the only document that is debated within 
the party and is accepted as common ground (Guinaudeau, Persico, 2013), and they give a good 
indication of the issues that the party deems to be of salience in an electoral campaign, and how the 
party frames those issues.  
While the Comparative Manifesto Project would be a ready-made database of coded manifestos for 
use in this study, it has two limitations which make it inapt here; firstly, the most recent electoral 
contests of interest here are not yet integrated into the project, and secondly, the project has been 
criticised for underestimating the salience of EU-related issues, because if a party politicises Europe 
in relation to another policy area such as welfare or agriculture, the coders must choose between 
one or the other categories (Ibid: 151).  To attempt to overcome this problem, this study uses an 
inductive method of categorisation of manifesto data, following Guinaudeau and Persico (2013). A 
keyword search for all entries with the stem ‘euro-’ or ‘EU’ was first conducted, with all hits making 
up the corpus of EU-related statements to be categorised. These statements were then categorised 
according to the policy areas they dealt with. Decisions then had to be made by the coder as to 
which of the three larger framing categories these statements belonged in, from cultural-identitarian, 
to economic, or utilitarian. In order to simplify the choice, these three umbrella categories have been 
broken down into several subcategories. Once the sentences were categorised under the apt 
subcategories and categories, the direction of the frame, whether EU-positive, EU-negative or EU-
neutral was then deciphered, by assigning each phrase a numerical value of +1 (EU-positive), -1 
(EU-negative), or 0 (EU-neutral).  
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Frame 
category 
Frame 
Subcategory UK 
France Germany 
Frame 
direction  
+1 -1 +1 -1 +1 -1 
Cultural-
identitarian 
 
Ethnic-nationalist 
We will make it a 
priority in our 
negotiations with the 
European Union that 
the 140,000 staff 
from EU countries 
can carry on making 
their vital contribution 
to our health and 
care system. (2017) 
‘the scale of 
migration triggered 
by new members 
joining [the EU] has 
had a real impact on 
local communities’ 
(2015) 
Il faut affirmer la souveraineté 
numérique de la France et de 
l’Europe face aux États-Unis, 
à la Chine, ou aux géants de 
l’internet ; l’indépendance 
technologique et la 
cybersécurité seront nos 
priorités ; il faut continuer à 
défendre nos valeurs et notre 
liberté d’expression. (2017) 
Nous instaurerons une 
politique de différenciation 
dans les relations de la 
France et de l’UE avec les 
pays en développement, en 
excluant les principaux pays 
émergents du bénéfice des 
droits de douane réduits 
prévus par le système de 
préférence généralisé 
européen (2012) 
We advocate for the  
strengthening of the 
usage of the German 
language in Europe. 
(2013) 
We reject the kind of 
immigration that abuses 
the freedom of 
movement in Europe 
and exploits our social 
security system. (2013) 
Institutional-civic 
nationalism 
We believe Britain’s 
interests are best 
served by 
membership of a 
European Union that 
is an association of 
its Member States. 
(2010) 
Applying transitional 
controls as a matter 
of course in the 
future for all new EU 
Member States. 
(2010) 
Continuer à enrichir la 
construction européenne avec 
des projets entre États 
pionniers, en commençant par 
le moteur franco-allemand’ 
(2012) 
Créer une redevance pour 
l’usage du réseau routier et 
autoroutier et empêcher le 
report de certains trafics 
routiers européens sur le 
réseau français (2007) 
Our education system 
is a strong part of the 
the European 
educational area. 
(2009) 
Germany must put an 
end to the EU’s 
tendency towards 
liberalisation in this 
regard. (2009) 
Multicultural-
universalist 
Yes to working 
together where we 
are stronger together 
than alone. (2015) 
In leaving the 
European Union, we 
have chosen a truly 
global role for Britain. 
(2017) 
Notre destin se jouera dans 
une Europe plus rassemblée. 
(2012) 
En revanche, nous restons 
opposes à l’entrée de la 
Turquie dans l’Union 
européenne. (2012) 
We must fly the flag for 
democracy, freedom, 
human rights, the rule 
of law and Europe 
(2017) 
We Europeans must 
take our fate into our 
own hands now more 
than ever. (2017) 
 
Economic 
 
Labour/Social Security 
We have taken 
action in Europe to 
promote your 
economic security 
(2015) 
We will negotiate 
new rules with the 
EU, so that people 
will have to be 
earning here for a 
number of years 
before they can claim 
benefits, including 
the tax credits that 
top up low wages 
(2015) 
La France, et plus encore 
l’Europe qui est le bon cadre 
d’action en la matière, doivent 
apporter de la protection’ 
(2007) 
La priorité pour l’Union 
européenne n’est donc plus 
la libéralisation et la 
concurrence, mais dans la 
promotion de l’emploi et de 
la croissance, dans un 
contexte de mondialisation 
et de concurrence 
internationale qui peut se 
révéler déloyale.(2012) 
Further steps towards a 
common European 
labour market lie in a 
better exchange of 
languagesm as well as 
a better portability of 
educational certificates 
and social security. 
(2013) 
For far too long in 
Germany, Europe and 
beyond, we have lived 
at the expense of future 
generations – in terms 
of financial markets as 
well as the environment. 
(2013) 
Wealth/Prosperity 
European countries 
need to work 
together to boost 
global economic 
growth, fight global 
poverty (2010) 
Overall we are still 
too dependent on 
slow-growing 
European markets. 
(2015) 
Sans rien céder de ses 
valeurs, notre pays, avec 
l’Europe, doit aussi se doter 
d’une politique qui lui permette 
d’assurer sa souveraineté 
économique et de tirer le 
meilleur parti de la 
mondialisation sur le plan 
économique. (2007) 
Enfin, nous souhaitons que 
ce principe de réciprocité 
s’applique à l’accès aux 
marchés publics : l’Europe 
ne doit autoriser l’accès à 
ses marchés publics qu’aux 
entreprises des pays qui, en 
retour, ouvrent l’accès à 
leurs propres marchés 
publics. (2012) 
‘A stable currency is a 
necessity for a strong 
economy and stable 
political relations’ 
(2009) 
The German farming 
economy requires fair 
competition with other 
EU countries. (2009) 
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Utilitarian 
Political 
efficiency/efficacy 
We will push for 
further reform of the 
EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy. 
(2015) 
We took Britain out of 
Eurozone bailouts, 
including for Greece 
–the first ever return 
of powers from 
Brussels (2015) 
Enfin, les mécanismes 
institutionnels qui régissent le 
fonctionnement de l’Union 
européenne ne doivent pas 
empêcher ceux qui veulent 
avancer plus vite de le faire 
(2007) 
Ce n’est pas parce qu’elle 
est indépendante, que la 
banque centrale 
européenne ne doit pas 
écouter, entendre, et 
prendre en compte les 
préoccupations exprimées, 
au nom des peuples, par les 
gouvernements des pays 
membres de la zone euro 
(2007) 
We support the 
proposals for a 
European Defence 
Union, and for a 
defence fund. (2017) 
The criterion must 
remain: we rule out any 
debt union. (2017)  
Security & Ecology 
The new CAP should 
reflect the 
importance we attach 
to the environment, 
to ensuring food 
security and to 
tackling global 
poverty (2010) 
‘We will release 
spending on 
unnecessary and 
bureaucratic EU 
defence initiatives 
and spend the 
money on our Armed 
Forces’ (2010) 
Face aux menaces qui 
l’entourent dans un monde 
toujours plus imprévisible, j’ai 
la conviction que l’europe sera 
l’un des principaux sujets des 
années qui viennent. (2017) 
Réformer en profondeur les 
accords de Schengen : 
expulser systématiquement 
de l’espace Schengen tout 
étranger reconnu coupable 
d’un crime ou d’un délit et 
en interdire l’accès à tout 
étranger condamné 
pénalement ou ayant 
participé à une entreprise 
terroriste (2017) 
We are convinced that 
Europe is 
indispensable for a 
peaceful, free and 
prosperous life is. 
(2013)  
A one-sided 
[climate]burden on a 
few EU countries and 
their economies must 
not be allowed to 
happen (2009) 
Table 1: Framing categories and subcategories 
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Within the cultural-identitarian category, the literature has found wide consensus on three 
subcategories of ethnic-nationalist framing, institutional-civic nationalist framing, and 
multicultural-universal framing (Helbing et al, 2010; Hoeglinger, 2016; Hutter, Grande et al 
2016). Ethnic-nationalist frames focus on cultural homogeneity and identity. An example of a 
phrase categorised as ethnic-nationalist, taken from the UK Conservative manifesto of 2015, 
is ‘the scale of migration triggered by new members joining [the EU] has had a real impact 
on local communities’. Accordingly, any sentence that drew a distinction between the 
national community and the EU was coded into this category. In this particular example, a 
numerical value of -1 was assigned, as it is deemed to be EU-negative. However, not all 
ethnic-nationalist frames are negative; an example from the UK Conservative manifesto of 
2017 attests: ‘We will make it a priority in our negotiations with the European Union that the 
140,000 staff from EU countries can carry on making their vital contribution to our health and 
care system’. This is given a value of +1, because it is talking about an exclusive feature of 
the in-group’s community – ‘our health and care system’ – whilst acknowledging the positive 
role EU citizens have played in it. 
Institutional-civic nationalism refers to the exclusivity of a particular political community. The 
example in the table above, taken from the French UMP manifesto of 2012, gives the 
impression that the Franco-German superiority can add value to the European project. This 
was given the numerical value of +1, as it is manifestly EU-positive. However, from the same 
manifesto, an example of an EU-negative frame in the institutional-civic nationalist category: 
‘Thanks to our solidarity, inequalities are felt less strongly than in the majority of other 
countries in Europe, and the French have suffered less from the crisis.’ The favourable 
comparison of France against other European countries shows a more chauvinistic sense of 
exceptionality that earned a -1.  
Finally, multicultural-universalist frames show a spirit of openness and diversity, and 
adherence to common values. In the example in the table above, taken from the German 
CDU/CSU manifesto of 2017, there is a very universalist sense that they wish to stand up 
and represent these universal values. Including Europe in the list of the values to be 
defended ensured that this was attributed a +1. A rare example of a multicultural-universalist 
frame attributed an EU-negative score comes from the UK Conservatives’ 2017 manifesto: 
‘In leaving the European Union, we have chosen a truly global role for Britain’, thereby 
implying that the EU is an exclusionary community that has turned its back on the rest of the 
world.  
The same inductive logic was applied to the categories of economic and utilitarian frames, 
as the examples in the above table attest; however given that the focus of this paper is on 
the cultural category of frames, we will not dwell on the other frames here. 
5. Research Design and Preliminary Results 
In a first step, the salience of Europe as an issue in domestic issues was measured. This 
was done by first identifying all the references to Europe from each of the manifestos for 
each country case. This involved running a simple document key word search, seeking out 
all references pertaining to ‘Euro-’, and ‘EU’. All sentences returning a hit were then exported 
into a new document, where a cursory word count of all words in the sentences referring to 
Europe was conducted. These were then calculated as a percentage of the total word count 
of the manifesto to give an indicative measure of the level of salience granted to Europe 
within the party programme. The results for each of the three latest elections of the selected 
country cases are displayed in figure 1, where manifesto ‘sets’ refer to the chronology of the 
elections, with ‘set 1’ being the manifestos from the earliest elections recorded in this study, 
and ‘set 3’ referring to the most recent.  
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 UK Conservatives France 
UMP/Républicains 
Germany 
CDU/CSU 
Manifesto set 1 1251 4.3% 3391 8.3% 2335 7.4% 
Manifesto set 2 2066 6.4% 1747 11.3% 4225 9.6% 
Manifesto set 3 2428 7.9% 2219 10% 1505 7.2% 
Figure 1: References to Europe in manifestos 
References to Europe follow a clear trajectory of expansion in the UK, as the percentage of 
references to Europe increases continuously from 2010-2017 across all three Conservative 
manifestos. This suggests that the salience of Europe has continuously grown in the UK 
over the years. Despite this clear trend of rising salience, the single-digit percentages are 
suggestive that the observation made by Hoeglinger that Europe has only gained modest 
salience in domestic elections (2016: 128) still stands going into the 2010s. In France, the 
salience of Europe begins in 2007 from a higher level than its peak levels in the UK in 2017, 
implying that it is a more salient issue for the French domestic elections than for the British. 
Between 2007 and 2012, the salience of Europe jumps by 3% to a high across all three 
countries of 11.3%. In 2017, this falls back to 10%, but nonetheless remains comparatively 
higher than the British and German cases, suggesting that Europe as an issue occupies an 
important place in the electoral contest. Although a quantitative comparison of the salience 
of Europe to other issues in the respective electoral agendas of the countries under analysis 
here is beyond the scope of this paper, Hoeglinger’s (2016) own results indicate that only the 
three most salient issues examined in his study scored above 10%. In Germany, a similar 
pattern to France is evident, with a sharp incline from the 2009 level of salience of 7.4% 
recorded in 2013, to its highest overall level of 9.6%, before dropping back to under the 2009 
level in 2017.  
As a next step, the statements pertaining to Europe were categorised and subcategorised 
according to the frame placed on them by the parties. As a recap, the three established 
categories of frames are cultural-identitarian, economic, and other utilitarian frames. Within 
these categories are various subcategories of frames.  
As previously discussed, for the purposes of this study, the distinction between economic 
and utilitarian frames will be dissolved into a single category, in opposition to the cultural 
frames, which will be of principal interest here.  
Once all the statements pertaining to Europe had been categorised according to their frame, 
this left a set of raw data indicating the number of times each frame was used in each 
manifesto. In order to make this data comparable, these figures were turned into a 
percentage of the total number of sentences categorised per manifesto. The results are 
displayed in the following tables (figures 2-4).  
These tables reveal some interesting trends both within and across the country cases. In the 
first election of all three country cases, the number of cultural-identitarian frames as a 
percentage of all frames hovers around the one-third mark. For France and Germany, this 
figure drops a few percentage points from the first election to the second election, indicating 
a falling recourse to cultural framing strategies by the centre-right parties from manifesto set 
one to manifesto set two. In the UK, the opposite is true, with a dramatic rise in recourse to 
cultural framing strategies by the Conservatives from 2010 to 2015, from 33% to 47%. 
However, this tails off again in 2017, dipping under the levels of 2010 to 31%. In France and 
Germany, meanwhile, a dramatic rise in the number of cultural frames comes in 2017, with 
the French Républicains leading the trend of using cultural frames, as the only party to cross 
the 50% threshold. The German CDU/CSU alliance also reaches 45% recourse to cultural 
frames, which implies that there might be a structural trend towards the use of cultural 
framing strategies to talk about Europe in domestic electoral settings. 
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Type of frame 2010 Manifesto 2015 Manifesto  2017 Manifesto 
Cultural-Identitarian (N) 
 
33% (14) 47% (40) 31% (20) 
Ethnic nationalist 3% (1) 14% (12) 5% (3) 
Institutional-civic nationalism 23% (10) 29% (25) 11% (7) 
Multicultural-universalist 7% (3) 4% (3) 15% (10) 
Economic/Utilitarian (N) 67% (29) 53% (45) 69% (45) 
Labour/social security 0 2% (2) 2% (1) 
Wealth and prosperity 7% (3) 13% (11) 11% (7) 
Political efficiency/efficacy 53% (23) 33% (28) 48% (32) 
Other issues 7% (3) 5% (4) 8% (5) 
 
Total (N) 100% (43) 100% (85) 100% (66) 
Figure 2: UK Conservatives' Framing Strategies
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Type of frame 2007 Manifesto 2012 Manifesto  2017 Manifesto 
Cultural-Identitarian (N) 
 
36% (44) 33% (22) 54% (50) 
Ethnic nationalist 8% (10) 6% (4) 15% (14) 
Institutional-civic nationalism 20% (24) 21% (14) 32% (30) 
Multicultural-universalist 8% (10) 6% (4) 7% (6) 
Economic/Utilitarian (N) 64% (79) 67% (46) 46% (42) 
Labour/social security 7% (8) 18% (12) 4% (4) 
Wealth and prosperity 11% (14) 16% (11) 8% (7) 
Political efficiency/efficacy 30% (37) 29% (20) 28% (26) 
Other issues 16% (20) 4% (3) 5% (5) 
 
Total (N) 100 (123) 100 (68) 100 (92) 
Figure 3 French UMP/ Républicains Framing strategies
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Type of frame 2009 Manifesto 2013 Manifesto  2017 Manifesto 
Cultural-Identitarian (N) 
 
35% (46) 30% (65) 45% (36) 
Ethnic nationalist 7% (9) 4% (9) 3% (2) 
Institutional-civic nationalism 26% (34) 18% (38) 30% (24) 
Multicultural-universalist 2% (3) 8% (18) 12% 10 
Economic/Utilitarian (N) 65% (84) 70% (149) 55% (44) 
Labour/social security 4% (5) 6% (12) 5% (4) 
Wealth and prosperity 12% (15) 21% (46) 10% (8) 
Political efficiency/efficacy 28% (37) 32% (69) 25% (20) 
Other issues 21% (27) 10% (22) 15% (12) 
 
Total% (N) 100 (130) 100 (214) 100 (80) 
Figure 4 German CDU/CSU Framing strategies
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The tables above also display the break-down of subcategories of frames deployed by the 
respective parties from each of the country cases. It is interesting to note that in the case of 
the UK in 2015, the number of ethnic-nationalist frames deployed jumps significantly from 
3% of all frames, to 14%, which represents the largest change among all the subcategories 
of cultural-identitarian frames from 2010. This might be revelatory of a correlation between 
the increased proportion of cultural frames, and the deployment of an ethnic-nationalist 
framing strategy. The institutional-civic frames nonetheless retain the largest share of all 
cultural frames from 2010, registering a small increase from 23% to 29% of all frames. The 
multicultural-universalist frames are the least significant of this category of cultural-
identitarian frames, even losing percentage points between 2010 and 2015, despite the 
large growth in the use of cultural frames by the Conservatives overall. In 2017, the picture is 
somewhat different, with multicultural-universalist frames becoming the most important of the 
cultural-identitarian category, with a 15% share of all frames. The ethnic-nationalist 
subcategory of frames falls to just above its 2010 levels, at 5%, while institutional-civic 
nationalist frames decline most significantly from 29% to 11%.  
For the UMP/Républicain party of France, the trend of frame deployment within the cultural-
identitarian category is somewhat more consistent than for the British Conservatives, with 
institutional-civic nationalism remaining the most prevalent cultural-identitarian frame from 
2007 to 2017, albeit growing more sharply between 2012 and 2017. However, while ethnic-
nationalist frames and multicultural-universal frames were deployed in equal measures in 
2007 and 2012 (8% and 6% respectively), the ethnic-nationalist frames were deployed far 
more regularly than multicultural-universalist frames in 2017 (15% versus 7%). Similarly to 
the UK in 2015, with an overall increase in the proportion of cultural frames deployed in 
2017, there is a tendency of more frequent recourse to ethnic-nationalist frames.  
In Germany, the picture is different again, concerning the deployment of cultural-identitarian 
frames by the CDU/CSU party alliance. While in 2009 the highest proportion of cultural-
identitarian frames deployed fell in the institutional-civic nationalism category, with 26% of all 
frames deployed, ethnic-nationalist frames were the second most-used of the cultural-
identitarian category, with 7% of all frames. Multicultural-universalist frames were 
insignificant, making up just 2% of all frames used. In 2013, although the cultural frame 
category lost significance in comparison to the economic/utilitarian category, the 
multicultural-universalist category gained ground, making up 8% of all frames used, and 
overtaking ethnic-nationalist frames as the second-most significant cultural frame behind 
institutional-civic nationalist frames. In 2017, when cultural frames gained a large amount of 
ground on the other two framing categories among the CDU/CSU, it is interesting to note 
that the ethnic-nationalist frames slump to their lowest recorded proportion of all frames 
(3%), while multicultural-universalist frames gain significant ground, moving to 12% of all 
frames. This tendency seems to run counter to the French and British cases, where greater 
importance of the cultural frames categories vis-à-vis the other categories has been mirrored 
by greater recourse to ethnic nationalist frames.  
In the final step of the data gathering process, the directional scores of the frames were 
calculated for each party manifesto in the three country cases, as displayed in figures 5 and 
6. This was done by first assigning each phrase with a numerical value representing its level 
of support for Europe in principle. This numerical value was either +1 (EU-positive), -1 (EU-
negative) or 0 (neutral). Once each statement was given a value according to its direction, 
the sum of the directional values for all phrases within one frame category was calculated. 
For example, for the UK in 2010, the total number of phrases within the cultural-identitarian 
category was 14, while the aggregate frame direction for this category was -4. 
Once this calculation of frame direction for each category in each party manifesto had been 
carried out, a common scale had to be elaborated, in order to render the data from each 
different manifesto and each country comparable. This was done by turning the raw 
directional scores into a numerical score on a common scale between -1 (100% of 
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statements being EU-negative), and +1 (100% of statements being EU-positive). To this 
end, each of the raw directional scores for each framing category was divided by the total 
number of phrases belonging to that category. In the aforementioned example of cultural-
identitarian frames in the UK, that means that the aggregate directional score for the 
category of -4 was divided by the total number of frames belonging to this category, of 14. 
This gave a final score of -0.29. 
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Figure 5: Cultural vs Economic/Utilitarian frames - directional values for UK   Figure 6: Cultural vs Economic/Utilitarian frames - directional 
values for France 
 
 
Figure 7: Cultural vs Economic/Utilitarian frames - direction values for Germany
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The charts above display the final results of the aggregate frame directions deployed by 
each party in each of the manifestos analysed. This completes the previous observations of 
recourse to frame categories, by indicating the direction of the frames that the parties used 
within each category. 
In the UK, the scores recorded for the cultural and economic/utilitarian categories show little 
consistency at all, with the economic/utilitarian frames being deployed against the EU most 
regularly in 2010, before a radical jump in negative cultural frames is recorded in 2015 
coupled with a tempering of negative economic/utilitarian frames. This is then completely 
turned on its head again in 2017, with the cultural frames actually deployed in a positive 
direction towards the EU, while the economic/utilitarian frames grow more negative than in 
2015.  
In France, the picture is generally more positive, with the EU framed in a positive direction by 
the UMP/Républicains across all three campaigns, however there is a steady trend of 
decline from 2007 to 2017 in the overall level of positive framing. The most radical change is 
noted between 2007 and 2012 in the economic/utilitarian frames category, as the number of 
positive frames deployed in this regard declines substantially, before climbing again in 2017. 
2007 represents the most negative manifesto in terms of cultural-identitarian frames (+0.23), 
with 2012 becoming markedly more positive in this regard (+0.36), before declining once 
more in 2017 (+0.3).  
In Germany, trends are more linear. Starting from an already higher base than the other two 
countries, the economic/utilitarian frame directions increase from +0.57 in 2009 to +0.73 in 
2017. The cultural/identitarian frames, by contrast show a steady, if small decline across the 
three manifestos, from +0.61 in 2009 to +0.5 in 2017. This score still remains 
overwhelmingly EU-positive when taken in comparison to the other two country cases, 
indicating that, as predicted by the literature (Kriesi 2007), Germany is the most Europeanist 
country in the case study. The overall scores for frame direction indicate a small incline in 
EU optimism among the German CDU/CSU from 2009 to 2017.  
6. Findings and discussion 
Earlier in the study, it was hypothesised that the salience of Europe would increase steadily 
over the course of the period studied (H1a). This was measured by the number of words in 
each party manifesto dedicated to European issues as a percentage of the total amount of 
words in the manifesto. The findings reveal that in the United Kingdom, Europe becomes a 
consistently more salient issue for the Conservative Party, with the percentage of words in 
the manifesto dedicated to Europe rising as a percentage of the total manifesto year on year, 
going from the very modest level of salience of 4.1% in 2010, to 7.9% by 2017. In France 
and Germany, this pattern does not find confirmation. While the level of salience of Europe 
to the French centre-right party shows an overall rise from 8% in 2007 to 10% in 2017, the 
level of salience in 2012 reached a height of 11.3%, before falling back again between 2012 
and 2017. In Germany, a similar pattern of salience exists for the CDU/CSU as for the 
centre-right in France, with a peak level of 9.6% in 2013, up from 7.4% in 2009. However, 
again in 2017 the level falls backward, this time dipping narrowly under the original 2009 
level of 7.2%. Hypothesis 1a therefore is not supported.  
Hypothesis 1b states that the level of salience will differ in each electoral setting, due to the 
systemic salience dynamic at play within each country-case’s party system (Dolezal, 
Hellstrom, 2016). In the French case, the level of salience of Europe to the centre-right is 
significantly higher than in the other two countries throughout the three elections studied, 
with 2012 representing an apogee of importance for the European issue. This is indicative of 
these systemic dynamics. The same is true for Germany, where the 2013 manifesto reveals 
a higher level of importance of Europe to the CDU/CSU than any of the other two elections. 
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In the UK, the 2010 election shows a very limited level of salience of Europe to the 
Conservatives compared to the next two elections. In 2017 meanwhile, the election was 
labelled the ‘Brexit election’ and the salience of Europe rose accordingly. The absence of 
any clear, pan-national trend in the levels of salience, with each domestic setting following its 
own pattern based on party-system dynamics, seems to support H1b. To be sure, a 
comparison of the salience of Europe in centre-right party manifestos with other parties 
operating in the domestic party systems would be required to confirm this hypothesis, which 
is beyond the scope of the present study, but the patterns found here lead to a tentative 
confirmation of H1b.  
In accordance with the cultural shift hypothesis (Grande et al, 2016), hypothesis 2a predicted 
that a rise in the salience of Europe would be matched by greater recourse to cultural-
identitarian frames. However, the results on this front are mixed. In the UK, the 2017 
Conservative manifesto dedicated the highest percentage of its words to Europe, yet the 
31% of frames attributed as cultural-identitarian is the lowest score of all three of the 
manifestos examined. However, the UK is a special case, given that the issue of Europe 
evolves to the issue of Brexit from 2015 to 2017. The jump in salience of Europe in the UK 
Conservative manifesto from 2010 to 2015 is also matched by a jump in the use of cultural-
identitarian frames from 33% to 47%. In France, the UMP dedicates the highest percentage 
of its manifesto to Europe in 2012, implying that this was a salient issue in this election. 
However, the percentage of cultural-identitarian frames recorded is also the lowest of all 
three manifestos examined, at just 33%. It is in fact the economic/utilitarian frames that grow 
in significance in this election, therefore disconfirming the hypothesis, and implying that the 
issue of Europe was inextricably tied to the economic crisis, which provided the backdrop for 
this election. In 2017, the picture is different, with the percentage of cultural-identitarian 
frames jumping above 50% in the Républicain manifesto. However, the percentage of the 
manifesto dedicated to Europe falls in comparison to 2012. This trend is repeated in 
Germany for the CDU/CSU party, with the highest level of salience for Europe being 
recorded in 2013, which corresponds with the lowest percentage of cultural-identitarian 
frames. This serves to disconfirm hypothesis 2a. Yet, just as in France, the recourse to 
cultural-identitarian frames bounces to its highest level by quite some margin in the 2017 
manifesto, despite a relative fall in salience. This pattern could be attributed to the high 
salience of the ongoing Eurozone crisis at the time of the 2012/2013 elections in France and 
Germany. These elections could therefore prove to be outlier elections. Further, it is 
interesting that in the latest election in both France and Germany, the proportion of cultural-
identitarian frames used by the centre-right hit the levels of the British Conservatives in the 
2015 election, as the Eurozone crisis no longer occupies the forefront of European themes. 
Therefore, while hypothesis 2a cannot be confirmed, the more recent evidence might 
suggest that there is an ongoing shift towards cultural-identitarian framing strategies across 
all three countries. The hypothesis would therefore bear further testing in future elections.  
Hypothesis 2b predicted that any shift towards more cultural frames among the centre-right 
parties under observation would be matched by an increase in EU-negative sentiment, 
especially in party-systems where a strong radical-right party is present (Hoeglinger, 2016). 
Interestingly, in every instance across all country-cases where the percentage of cultural-
identitarian frames used by the centre-right parties in their manifestos increases, so the 
directional score of the frame category becomes more negative. In the UK in 2015, the 
Conservatives use cultural-identitarian frames 47% of the time, with a directional score of -
0.75, indicating that three-quarters of the statements the Conservatives made in cultural 
terms on Europe were critical. While the level of negativity in the UK is unrivalled in the other 
two cases, the pattern nonetheless persists. In France, the Républicains framed 54% of the 
statements on Europe that appeared in their manifesto in cultural-identitarian terms – the 
only case of a party using more cultural frames than economic/utilitarian frames - recording a 
directional score of +0.3, which is 0.06 points lower than in 2012. In Germany, the CDU/CSU 
frames the highest proportion of its manifesto relating to Europe in cultural-identitarian terms 
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in 2017, with 45% of frames appearing in this category. This is also matched by a drop in the 
directional score in the cultural-identitarian category from +0.52 in 2013 to +0.5 in 2017. 
Nonetheless the framing of the EU by the CDU/CSU remains overwhelmingly positive.  
While the manifesto data do not allow for an analysis that takes into account the presence of 
a radical right contender in the party-system, we might surmise from the success enjoyed by 
Marine Le Pen and the Front National in France in recent times, as well as UKIP’s meteoric 
rise in terms of vote percentage between 2010 and 2015, and its ability to influence the 
agenda in the UK, that a strong radical right contender does indeed have an effect on the 
centre-right’s framing strategy. In Germany, where the radical right element of Alternativ für 
Deutschland has only spawned since 2013, its influence on centre-right framing strategies 
appears to be more dubious – however, the unprecedented success of finishing as 
Germany’s third largest party at the 2017 election and entering the Bundestag with 94 
deputies will surely serve to expand its influence in this regard. While this does not represent 
a satisfactory empirical testing of hypothesis 2b, the correlation between the cultural shift 
among the centre-right parties under examination here and the electoral successes of 
radical right elements in the same election cycles is too coincidental to ignore.  
7. Conclusion 
This study has in part attempted to test the validity of the postfunctional theory of European 
integration, by examining the politicisation of Europe in domestic elections of three Member 
States. Taking the mainstream centre-right parties of France, Germany and the UK as its 
subject, this study has engaged in a diachronic examination of the framing strategies that 
these parties have adopted on Europe in the three most recent elections. The study set out 
with the primary aim of unearthing a ‘cultural shift’ (Grande et al 2016) in the framing 
strategies of centre-right parties, with the expectation that any such move towards framing 
Europe in cultural terms would be accompanied by the manifestation of heightened 
scepticism towards Europe.  
The findings show that while evidence of a cultural shift in framing strategy exists, an 
accompanying increase in Euroscepticism was not found across the board. Although in 
France and Germany an increase in cultural frames is accompanied by a reduction in the 
aggregate level of support for Europe, this reduction is gradual, and the aggregate direction 
of frames remains positive. It is therefore more appropriate to talk of a (slight) ‘erosion of 
Europhilia’ rather than a ‘rise of Euroscepticism’ in the centre-right parties of France and 
Germany. For the UK, the Eurosceptic case par excellence, cultural frames were used most 
in the 2015 Conservative campaign, when the party’s Euroscepticism seemingly reached an 
apogee.  
By and large, the conclusions reached in the course of this study are consonant with studies 
that went before it on the topic of politicisation of Europe. Nonetheless, the study was 
constrained by numerous factors, not least its small scale, but in particular the lack of 
professional coders in coding the manifestos, and a lack of reference to a recognised 
codebook. The coding of the manifestos undertaken here was therefore necessarily 
normative in nature, and a potential source of dispute of the validity of the findings. In spite 
of this, it is hoped that the singular focus on the frame strategies and directions of party-
families shines a new light on an important element of the politicisation debate, which is 
believed to provide an empirical basis for testing the postfunctional theory of European 
integration.   
While this study focused exclusively on the centre-right party-family, future research should 
undertake to draw comparisons of the direction of frames of all party-families across the 
board. Given the wide variations in levels of Euro-negativity recorded across the three 
country-cases of this study, it seems plausible that the level of optimism or pessimism 
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towards Europe could follow a party-systemic dynamic, rather than a pan-national, party-
family one. If this is the case, then a re-evaluation of the premise of European integration as 
the cause of politicisation in and of itself is at hand. As this study has revealed, and as has 
been concluded in another study (Grande, Hutter, 2016), it is the country which is least 
integrated where further European integration is most disputed. Further individual-level 
studies of countries with differing levels integration are therefore required, to gain a more 
thorough understanding of the drivers of Euroscepticism. From the present study, the 
answer to the original question of whether politicisation has caused a Eurosceptic turn in the 
centre-right must be that, while there is evidence of heightened politicisation over the time 
period studied, and while evidence of a cultural shift has been observed across the board, 
the UK Conservative party is the only centre-right element that can be properly described as 
Eurosceptic. However, given that the recent cultural shift has also been accompanied by an 
erosion of support for the EU, perhaps we stand at the beginning of a turning point only 
now? To answer that question, only time will tell.  
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